Prinz(2007)『道徳の感情的構成』第二章「感情、道徳的、非道徳的」

The Emotional Construction of Morals

2.1 感情の理論

2.1.1 二つの見解

• 認知主義vs. 非認知主義
  • 認知主義=emotions essentially involve judgments or thoughts.
  • The problem is that neither approach sits well with emotionism. Both views raise a problem for the epistemic thesis that moral judgments necessarily involve emotions.
  • What sets cognitive theorists apart is the claim that emotions contain cognitive elements essentially. A mere feeling, for example, would not be enough.
  • 現代的な心理学の認知=評価（appraisals）
    • An appraisal is a representation of an organism/environment relation that bears on well-being.
    • そうした関係をconsernと呼ぼう。
    • Anger, for instance, involves an appraisal of threat or offense.
    • On standard cognitive theories, emotions are felt responses to appraisal judgments, and appraisal judgments are explicit, though perhaps unconscious, assessments of one’s relation to the world.
    • If my stimulus evaluation checks lead to this pattern of answers the resulting state is anger.
• デカルト以来の非認知主義
  • 感情の機能性を説明できないのではないか。
  • 感情の定義: A pure feeling would be a feeling whose identity is exhausted by its felt aspect or phenomenal character.
  • But they highlight an important difference between identification procedures and identity conditions: states that can be identified by their phenomenal character may have further unfelt attributes that are necessary for their identity.
• ヒュームはどうか。
  • 感情=印象。sansationsの訳語...?
  • 感情の反表象主義&志向性を欠いている。
  • いずれにせよかなりnon-cognitve
• James=Langeの見解。身体の表象である。
  • William James (1884) and Carl Lange (1885). They argue that emotions are feelings of patterned changes in the body.
  • Emotions are internal states that register bodily changes. The central argument for both of them involves an exercise in mental subtraction. Imagine an intense emotion and then systematically eliminate every bodily feeling associated with that state. When the last bodily feeling is removed, there will be nothing left to the state that one would call an emotion. Emotions are felt perceptions of bodily changes.
  • According to both, emotions can occur without judgments or other cognitions.

2.1.2 感情主義の関与は何か

• 道徳判断は非道徳的判断を含む。
• In sum cognitive theories of emotion present a dilemma for the emotionist about morality.

2.1.3 身体化に対する事実

• 概念
  • 定義: A concept is a mental representation that can be combined with other mental representations by the person (or creature) who possesses it.
  • To say that emotions are necessarily cognitive is to say that one cannot have an emotion without possessing and tokening certain concepts.
• 認知？
  • 実験結果
  • These findings strongly suggest that emotions can arise without judgments, thoughts, or other cognitive mediators.
• まとめ I have been arguing that somatic signals are both necessary and sufficient for emotions. This tells against cognitive theorists, who insist on the necessity of judgments, thoughts, or concepts. It also tells against Hume, who identifies emotions with sui generis impressions, rather than impressions of bodily changes. It appears to be a solid victory for James and Lange. The story isn’t quite that simple, however. Their somatic theory falls prey to a pair of serious objections. I will discuss these in the next two sections.

2.1.4 合理的な評価と志向性

• 合理的評価問題
  • =An emotion can be rational or irrational, while a mere pang or twinge is always arational. Call this the Rational Assessment Problem.
• Emotions seem to be meaningful but not cognitive. There is evidence that they represent, but equally good evidence that they do not require the deployment of concepts.
• しかし、そもそも表象自体を疑問視する議論を展開。
  • Representation does not require cognition. We can have meaningful mental states without deploying any concepts.
  • ドレツキ・ミリカン
    • According to Dretske, a mental representation, M, represents that which it has the function of reliably detecting.
    • Pain represents physical maladies because it is reliably caused by them, and was evolved for that purpose.
• この見解の成立のために必要なふたつの問い。
  1. What reliably causes emotions to occur?
  2. And, of all the things that cause emotions, what do they have the function of detecting? *　音楽・悲しみの進化的説明の例。

       * In sum, Dretske’s independently motivated theory of representation delivers a very satisfying answer to the question about what sadness represents. (?)It simply falls out of Dretske’s theory that sadness represents loss. The important thing about this outcome is that Dretske’s theory does not depend on any assumptions about the form or format of representations. There is no condition in his theory requiring that the mental states to which it applies be proposition, conceptual, or cognitive. 
     

• ドレツキvs.James=Langeの結果
  • James and Lange imply that emotions are sensations of bodily states, and hence representations of those states. Dretske’s theory, and others like it, suggests that James and Lange were wrong. Emotions are reliably caused by bodily changes but they represent things such as loss and danger, the organism/environment relations that induce these changes in us. James and Lange were right about the form that emotions take, but wrong about their content. In a word, emotions represent concerns.
  • この路線で合理的評価問題も解決可能（読み飛ばし p.65あたり）。
• the embodied appraisal theoryへ。 By supplementing the James–Lange theory with an account of how emotions represent, this problem can be solved. I call this the embodied appraisal theory. Emotions are embodied, because they are somatic signals, just as James and Lange maintained. But emotions are also appraisals, insofar as they represent concerns, as standard cognitive theories maintain (Prinz, 2004).

2.1.5 身体的類似性、基本的感情、そして測定

• ほぼ読み飛ばし。概要はまとめを読んで分かったつもり。
• 開かれた問い論法の論駁がなかなかあざやか。p.68あたり。

2.2 道徳的感情

• 道徳的感情の定義
  • As a rough definition, I will say that moral emotions are emotions that arise in the context of morally relevant conduct. More specifically, moral emotions promote or detect conduct that violates or conforms to a moral rule.
  • My analysis is a bit different（スミスに比べて）. I will begin with a distinction between reactive and reflexive emotions. These correspond, roughly, to what some authors call ‘‘other-blame’’ and ‘‘self-blame’’ emotions (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000), but they also include emotions of praise.

2.2.1 反応的道徳的感情

• 反応的道徳的感情の定義
  • I define reactive moral emotions as emotions that arise when another person (or group) is interpreted as conforming or violating a moral rule.
  • Reactive moral emotions divide into two classes:
  • blame or, in Humean terms, and disapprobation.
  • praise or, in Humean terms, approbation
• RozinのCAD Model.

2.2.2 反省的道徳的感情

表1.1. 感情主義の種類

	部外者	自身	愛する人
対人	怒り	罪	Hurt
対コミュニティ	軽蔑	罪/恥	Hurt/Ashamed
対自然	嫌悪	恥	Ashamed

2.2.3 肯定的感情と道徳性

• (急に先の展開が読みやすくなってきたので一旦飛ばす。)

2.2.4 ケアすること、同情、関心

• (急に先の展開が読みやすくなってきたので一旦飛ばす。)

2.2.5 道徳的感情(sentiments)

• "sentiment"の定義
  • I will use the term ‘‘sentiment’’ to refer to an emotional disposition (see Prinz, 2004).
  • A sentiment is a disposition whose occurrent manifestations (or working memory encodings, or neural activation patterns) are emotions.

一旦ここまで。